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Introduction 
This paper investigates the idea that governance has changed in the contemporary 
world so that there is no longer, if there ever was, simply a dominant power, or set of 
powers, which are able to exert control. Governance is distributed, rather than 
centralised or territorialised, so it is not clear where responsibility lies or where the 
fulcrum of control resides. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri describe this situation in 
their books Empire (2000) and Multitude (2004), under the rubric of ‘Empire.’ At the 
same time, they claim that this situation both manifests and aids the democratic 
‘Multitude’ of people. However, while distributed governance may offer new 
strategies of radical or democratic subversion, there is no cause for easy optimism that 
these new systems of power will automatically lead to democracy. Information and 
communication technology is a central tool in distributing governance, but this 
technology is not inherently destabilising of arbitrary power. The opposite is as likely 
as the former. Furthermore, there are radical differences within the Multitude, which 
in turn is capable of constructing new elites and discriminations. The distribution of 
governance, with its concurrent disguise of responsibility, may indeed help 
established powers increase their power.  
 
This paper proceeds first by briefly describing the Autonomist history of Negri’s 
thought, his earlier pronouncements more overtly ambivalent than his recent works. 
Then Hardt and Negri’s ideas about Empire are described within the context of 
prevalent views about the information society. Examples of distributed governance 
Marshall  Negri, Hardt, distributed governance and open source software 
 
being used to reinforce power are presented to show that distribution is not 
necessarily democratic. Networks such as the internet developed more out of the 
needs of military and corporate expansion and mobility rather than democracy; thus 
they may retain features of their original purpose as much as they may challenge the 
dominant powers. Finally, open source groups do not replicate the democratic features 
assumed by Negri and Hardt. While agreeing with the general sentiment of Negri and 
Hardt’s work, this paper aims to shift the analytic emphasis in discussions of 
distributed governance, and to temper over-optimistic views of its democratic 
potential.  
 
Autonomist Marxism—struggle and technology 
Autonomism grew out of the radical Marxist operaismo (‘workerism’) movement in 
mid-1960s Italy. Both movements claim that the prime conflict is between those who 
create and those who appropriate, or between those who impose work and those who 
have to work (Cleaver 1981). In these theories there is no clear line as to who is in the 
working class, and there is no easy assumption that all members of this class have 
uniform interests—divisions can be imposed upon them by capital (Cleaver 2000, 
113ff.). However, it is the workers, in this loose sense, who drive capitalist 
development, for the need to disrupt and defeat the workers spurs capital to develop 
new defences. Therefore, the political history of capital is the ‘history of the 
successive attempts of the capitalist class to emancipate itself from the working class’ 
(Tronti 1965). In this spirit, Panzieri (1981) argued against ideas of the independent 
development of technology, proposing that capitalism develops technological 
innovation both as a weapon against the working class, and to reproduce and impose 
its own form of objectivity and rationality. This innovation may lead to opportunities 
for subversion, but it is never automatically emancipatory. As Cleaver (1989) regards 
this situation, ‘[I]t is often the failure of a given technology to serve its intended 
purpose of social control which gives rise on the part of capitalist managers to the 
demand for the development of new technologies and the funnelling of resources into 
the appropriate fields.’ Capitalist technology constantly increases the amount of 
production possible by a single worker, but it rarely decreases that worker’s need to 
work. ‘The efforts of business to convert technological change into higher profits and 
more work is the desire to maintain its control over society.’ Thus, the skilled factory 
workers of the early twentieth century provoked developments in de-skilling 
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workplaces, and this led to the semi-participatory welfare State as an effort to control 
and contain revolutionary activity. Then, as these ‘mass workers’ refused to limit their 
demands for wages or for participation in the State, the dominant class attempted to 
repeal welfare, replacing it with discipline by austerity: trade unions were attacked, 
factories become more robotic with less workers (or with workers controlled or under 
surveillance by computers), and middle class work was deskilled and its privileges 
eroded (Negri 1989, 89-101). Capital became more mobile to escape workers’ 
demands, and more money was invested in speculative activities: ‘Beneath the rosy 
images of the information society lie the stark goals of “control and reduction in the 
costs of labour”‘ (Negri, quoted in Dyer-Witheford 2004).  
 
The whole of organised society, then, is geared towards the replication and 
reproduction of capital. This system is sometimes labelled the ‘social factory’ or the 
‘diffuse factory’ (Negri 1989, 204). Thus contestation with capitalism moves beyond 
the actual factory (Dyer-Witheford 2004; Cleaver 2000, 70) and the antagonism is 
polyvalent and multiple (Negri 1989, 87). This leads to Hardt and Negri’s 
replacement of the ‘working class’ with the category of ‘Multitude.’  
 
The dyad: Empire and multitude 
Like a number of contemporary thinkers, Hardt and Negri propose that the world is 
being divided into two. The governing terms of their discussion are ‘Empire’ and 
‘Multitude.’ The importance of Empire, which Hardt and Negri distinguish from 
imperialism, is that ‘Empire establishes no territorial center of power and does not 
rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus 
of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, 
expanding frontiers’ (2000, xii). Elsewhere, Negri defines Empire as ‘the transfer of 
sovereignty of nation-states to a higher entity,’ but not to a World Nation, or to an 
existent nation like the United States (2004, 59). While Empire contains the dynamics 
of capitalism, the concept is not restricted to capital alone, for it is intended to capture 
the diffuseness of contemporary power.  
 
Negri and Hardt’s use of the term ‘Empire’ is unfortunate as it may imply a single 
center of power, and many critics attempt to refute Hardt and Negri’s idea by arguing 
that the current U.S. government is attempting to establish a conventional Empire or 
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is acting as if it already had one. However, it is not clear that this U.S. empire will be 
attained; it depends on the cooperation of other states, and some claim that the Bush 
Administration’s attempts to extend and enforce U.S. control will destroy U.S. 
dominance (Johnson 2004; Soros 2003). The corporate world seems split on the war 
in Iraq rather than uniformly behind the U.S.A. The Iraq war favours some 
corporations (Haliburton, MCI, Bechtel) over others (Microsoft, Coca Cola) who fear 
destruction of their markets in the Middle East. Furthermore, while the U.S.A. is very 
powerful, other states also have power, as do NGOs, and the movements of capital 
and chaos in markets are other sources of influence outside the control of any state. 
 
To some extent, power has always been distributed. Political scientists discuss the 
‘balance of power,’ which implies there is never a sole power and that power arises in 
‘ratios,’ to use Norbert Elias’s term. Elias claims that power ratios ‘are bi-polar at 
least, and usually multi-polar’ (1978, 74-5, 131). Even dictators and absolute 
monarchs are not completely free to act, being constrained by the activities of others 
(Elias 1983, 277ff.). Power ratios are an expression of the dynamic patterning of 
human coaction. Those patterns, which are easily activated, express the established 
modes of power. Once power is looked at in this way, rather than in terms of a thing 
that someone possesses and other people do not, then it can be recognised that there is 
always contestation. What is different in the contemporary world is that many of these 
power ratios operate over almost the whole planet simultaneously, rather than being 
confined to particular areas. 
 
Because the term ‘Empire’ lacks clarity, I will use the term ‘distributed governance’ 
to refer to power being diffused through a system, displaying distributed 
responsibility, and of appearing in places with no apparent origin. In Negri and 
Hardt’s analysis‘Multitude’ is a term with several meanings. Firstly it refers to an 
irreducible multiplicity of subjects (Negri 2004, 111). As such it is opposed to the 
supposed unitary conception of ‘the people’ that has been the conceptual basis of 
Western sovereignty (Hardt and Negri 2004, 79, 99). Second, Multitude is the ‘class 
of productive singularities, the class of the operators of immaterial labour’ (Negri 
2004, 112). This is an unfortunate definition as it presumably excludes unproductive 
singularities or people who engage in ‘material labour’—leaving out much of the 
world, which earlier Autonomist theory did not. The Multitude is all those who labour 
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and produce under capital, and Hardt and Negri assert that the differences dividing 
labour no longer exist (2004, 107). As they put it, ‘The creation of the Multitude, its 
innovation in networks, and its decision-making ability in common makes democracy 
possible for the first time today’ Problems of difference and separation are essentially 
dismissed. Finally, the Multitude appears to have the singular desire ‘to recreate this 
world in its image and likeness.’ (2004, 340). So, Empire creates Multitude and 
Multitude creates the Empire of distributed power, in mutuality. 
 
Hardt and Negri claim that, ‘the creative forces of the Multitude that sustain Empire 
are also capable of autonomously constructing a counter-Empire, an alternative 
political organization of global flows and exchanges’ (2000, xv). It appears that the 
term ‘Multitude,’ through its connotations of multiplicity, entails the fall of the 
implied singularity of Empire when itself it makes up part of the distributed dynamics. 
If taken seriously as intertwined, then no overthrow or freedom need arise from 
mutual participation, any more than the Hegelian dependence of masters on slaves 
means that slaves can easily rebel.  
 
Rather than agreeing with Hardt and Negri’s techno-optimism, I argue that Empire 
and Multitude are not separable into power and democracy. In the Autonomist sense, 
although capitalist social formations may arise as defence from the actions of the 
Multitude, this does not mean that liberation is automatic, although a new stage of 
struggle may arise. Power being distributed or networked does not automatically 
mean democracy. The more powerful the node the more alliances it may be able to 
make, the more entrenched pathways of action it can activate. Networks can extend 
central power out into the world as much as weaken it. Networks interact and thus 
‘communicate,’ but there is no need for these communications to be meaningful, and 
they may not enable us to find commonality as Hardt and Negri suggest (2004, xiii, 
xv). Groups can interact and polarise or separate. They can increase mutual hatred as 
much as ‘community’. Communication and connection is not an unrelieved good 
always bringing harmony or unity. Popular resistance can also be oppressive of 
others, as happens with the Christian Right’s resistance to secularism and the non-
righteous, or in neo-fascism’s resistance to race mixing. Resistance can become 
institutionalised, in ‘rituals of rebellion’ and allow people to let off steam and engage 
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in minor rebellions, which do not affect the overall patterns of power (Gluckman 
1956, 1963).  
 
We can usefully compare Negri and Hardt’s division between Empire and Multitude, 
with Benjamin Barber’s (1996) McWorld and Jihad division. By ‘Jihad’ Barber does 
not refer to Islamic fundamentalism, but to militant localisms or responses to 
globalisation that bricolage resistance out of traditions in order to oppose the 
‘mainstream’ West. By McWorld he refers to the uniformities of Western corporate 
capitalism and its overtaking and over-riding of local economies and ways of life. To 
Barber the forces of ‘wild capitalism’—which are described in terms of universal 
unregulated markets, spread and coordinated by innovations in communication 
technology, and which reduce freedom to consumer choice while fragmenting 
‘community’—are intimately bound up with a process of rejection; of localised 
tribalisms and frustration verging into violence, often based in religion, or ideologies 
of ‘blood.’ These rejections often make use of the information technologies necessary 
for the spread of modern capitalism, so that Jihad arises via McWorld. Modern 
localism depends on globalism and vice versa. Barber comments that since ‘neither 
Jihad nor McWorld promises a remotely democratic future ... the consequences of the 
dialectical interaction between them suggests new and startling forms of inadvertent 
tyranny’ (1996, 220).1 The point is simple: interdependence and networks do not of 
themselves generate democratic process. 
 
Information society 
Hardt and Negri suggest that Empire, Multitude and distributed governance are vitally 
dependent upon communication technology, and they use a fairly standard 
information society model to describe this situation: ‘Empire takes form when 
language and communication, or really when immaterial labor and cooperation 
become the dominant force’ (2000, 385). That is, ‘The development of 
communication networks has an organic relationship to the emergence of the new 
world order – it is, in other words, effect and cause, product and producer. 
                                                          
1 Castells similarly distinguishes between those who inhabit the global ‘space of flows’ and those who 
inhabit the local ‘space of place.’ Or, as he puts it, ‘elites are cosmopolitan, people are local’ (1996, 
415). There may no longer be a capitalist class but a network, ‘a faceless collective capitalist, made up 
of financial flows operated by electronic networks’ (474). Thus, ‘At its core, capital is global. As a 
rule, labour is local’ (475). 
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Communication not only expresses but organises the movement of globalisation (32). 
Hardt and Negri also point out that information technology ensures that 
‘[c]ommunication and control can be exercised efficiently at a distance,’ but rather 
than conclude that this could extend centralised control directly to the periphery, they 
only accept the idea of distributed control, suggesting that the internet makes a good 
model for Multitude (Hardt and Negri 2004, xv). They further imply that 
informational networks free liberation movements of the necessity of becoming 
organised in hierarchies, or of having to impose order after the chaos of revolution 
and thus assert that revolutionary freedom will finally be possible (68-78).  
 
The idea that the economy has fundamentally changed over the last 40 to 50 years 
from a basis in industry to a basis in knowledge or symbol manipulation, is not new. It 
goes at least as far back as management writer Peter Drucker’s Age of Discontinuity 
(1968), and, more popularly, but more hidden in academia, to the writings of Alvin 
Toffler, particularly The Third Wave (1980), and Powershift (1990). In some ways the 
claims that Negri and Hardt make for this change resemble the claims Toffler made, 
and which were embraced by the U.S. Republican party’s Newt Gingrich and the pro-
capitalist Progress and Freedom Foundation. ‘Big Government’ (the Welfare State) 
and ‘Big Unions’ are thus frequently represented by right wing proponents as 
outmoded relics in the information economy. Similarly, Bill Gates claims that the 
availability of information and networking equality will make capitalism frictionless 
and finally able to work (1995, Chapter 8). This is not to suggest that Hardt, Negri or 
Toffler are right wing theorists or dupes, but that perhaps we are dealing with 
widespread utopian longings rather than radical analysis—especially given the 
bypassing of Negri’s early writings and the Autonomist awareness of the struggles 
around technology. 
 
Central to these standard arguments has been the rise to power of the ‘knowledge 
worker,’ or in this case, the immaterial worker, or worker with immaterials (ideas, 
symbols, images, art, and so on). Referring to service work, Hardt and Negri write 
that ‘Since the production of services results in no material and durable good, we 
define the labor involved in this production as immaterial labor—that is, labor that 
produces an immaterial good, such as a service, a cultural product, knowledge, or 
communication’ (2000, 290). They explicitly tie this to computers transforming 
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‘laboring practices in such a way that they all tend toward the model of information 
and communication technologies’ (2000, 291). Negri (2004) argues that the transition 
‘from material to immaterial production’ means that the main instrument of 
production is the worker’s brain (a formulation that deletes the rest of the body). This 
is supposed to mean that the owners of capital no longer own the means of production 
and can no longer confiscate the fruits of production (Negri 2004, 91). In fact, work-
for-hire provisions are part of all modern copyright law, and it is more real to claim 
that capitalists now own, for only as long as they want, the ‘brains’ of the workers. 
Standard contracts forbid people from working on projects that are similar to projects 
they have previously worked on, so employee’s capacity to build up and use valuable 
knowledge is restricted. Furthermore, contemporary knowledge management systems 
seek to replace the specialised knowledge of particular workers with programs—a 
classic example of the Autonomist theory of capitalist development. 
 
Hardt and Negri imply that knowledge workers will cooperate democratically as 
Multitude to oppose capital. In contrast Toffler argues that whereas industrial 
production required standardisation and uniformity in the workplace, allowing the 
workforce to find a common cause out of a common experience, information work 
requires change, innovation and individually oriented production; therefore, the 
workforce has no sense of commonality and finds it hard to organise (1984, 38). 
Knowledge workers tend to unite only on certain issues rather than around groups of 
issues. People mix ideas from both ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ and can splinter on fundamental 
points. Lack of permanence in a workplace and constant competition between work 
groups also fracture bonds between people. Another early theorist of the information 
society, Daniel Bell, proposed that knowledge workers are divided into ‘four estates, 
the scientific, the technological, the administrative and the cultural’ with large 
operational disjunctions between them (1976, 374-6). Again, this suggests that the 
Multitude is not necessarily brought together. As Autonomist theory argues, the 
Multitude can be both divided and rendered replaceable by capitalist innovation.  
 
Hardt and Negri go on to suggest that this information economy challenges traditional 
ideas of property, as: 
 
[p]roducing increasingly means constructing cooperation and communicative 
commonalities … in the context of linguistic and cooperative production, labor and the 
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common property tend to overlap. Private property, despite its juridical powers, cannot 
help becoming an ever more abstract and transcendental concept and thus ever more 
detached from reality. A new notion of ‘commons’ will have to emerge on this terrain. 
(2000, 302) 
 
The information economy’s central paradox is that it encourages and requires quick 
and easy distribution of information, but capitalists need to restrict access in order to 
charge consumers and generate profit. The internet may thus seem radical as it allows 
data-products to be copied and distributed easily, causing panic to manufacturers who 
claim ownership of such products and who make their money selling them. 
 
Although the ways property is viewed may be changing, the ways property is 
implemented or appropriated may not change as a result of new views—any more 
than the idea that property is theft, or the idea that property is alienated from the 
worker, had long term effects on the ways property operates. Society can encompass 
several different ways of defining property. It could be argued that rather than 
property exploding under new ideas of digital commons, corporate property is being 
successfully extended into fields in which it would previously have been legally 
unjustified, such as patenting genes or other ‘natural’ products. James Boyle (1996) 
claims that the notion of the corporate author does for information what economic 
notions of natural markets did for the industrial revolution, by providing a method of 
appropriating what is really an intertwined production, or a naturally occurring 
phenomenon.  
 
If information equals property, then information cannot be free as in the old Hacker 
slogan. Workers have to create, but what they make is rarely their own. Instead it 
seems as if workers are appendages to some kind of program, which uses them only 
for as long as they are not replaceable. In similar fashion ‘ordinary people’ do not 
own information about themselves and, due to the risk of leaks, many information 
workers are under surveillance and control. There is a tendency for intelligence 
agencies and the corporate sector to work together to beat national competitors. This 
in turn leads to increased counter and pre-emptive surveillance. Toffler warned that 
‘If intelligence operations … become so intertwined with the everyday activities of 
society, so decentralised, so fused with business and other private interests, as to make 
effective control impossible, democracy will be in mortal peril’ (1990, 318). The new 
economy has intensified patterns of capitalist dominance—the corporate sector has 
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more relative power than it used to. Work has become total and inequalities of income 
have increased. Internationalisation is used as an excuse to increase the salaries of 
high level executives and decrease the wages of workers. The tax burden has shifted 
from the corporate sector onto the Multitude (Johnston 2003; Wolff 2004). The 
rollback of the state has mainly occurred in those areas in which it helped people, or 
in which it acted as a check on corporate action.  
 
Distributed governance 
As stated previously, Hardt and Negri imply that the network of distributed power 
ultimately generates democracy. Unfortunately there is little evidence that this is 
necessarily so. This section considers some cases in which distribution has not 
reinforced democracy or democratic accountability.  
 
It is doubtful that al-Qaeda, as network, is democratic, or particularly open, even 
though Hardt and Negri cover this point by claiming, without reference, that al-Qaeda 
is a centralised hierarchy like a drug cartel (2004, 89). The military can also organise 
as a network in response (2004, 59). Again it is unlikely this response will undermine 
hierarchy, although it may diffuse responsibility. Commanders now appear to have 
little responsibility for the behaviour of those under their command who supposedly 
‘act at their own initiative,’ as at Abu Ghraib where prisoners were abused in full 
view of troops who wandered casually around them. Yet it was not, we were told, the 
responsibility of the army, or of the commander of the gaols, or of the intelligence 
operatives who implied this might be the best procedure, but rather of a few people 
who happened to be photographed. The network diffuses connections of power. Even 
if the command encourages something, or tacitly approves it, they have no 
responsibility for the results. This vagueness may well help the centre maintain 
control in ways it could not do otherwise. This is in line with Negri’s statement that 
since ‘The world elite decides, but it never considers itself responsible,’ its decisions 
are blamed on, or simply portrayed as accommodation to the universal, and politically 
neutral, realities of the market; as with decisions about supplying AIDS drugs to 
Africa (2004, 92). Responsibility is distributed while the impact of power focused. 
Power is seemingly emptied out of place so that power can become total, as in 
Guantánamo Bay, where people are sequestered by the U.S.A. while outside the 
jurisdiction of that country’s laws. This is liminal governance. 
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The Australian government likewise claims that it will not be blackmailed by refugees 
killing themselves, or by dying while being incarcerated by the government. The 
power of the government acts by denying its power. ‘We’ are victims, not the 
refugees. The government excised parts of Australia from its official control, so that it 
could excise the rights of refugees arriving there, thus increasing its own power at the 
same time as diminishing its responsibilities, and incarcerating refugees outside the 
law. Although the temptation to accuse the Australian Government of lying is strong, 
perhaps it is true that the Prime Minister, John Howard, really does know very little of 
what is going on, and his constant appeals to ignorance are reflections of a 
government that finds it hard to negotiate a course amidst overwhelming and 
conflicting streams of information. Perhaps the Left ascribes the Right an unrealistic 
omnipotence.  
 
A business parallel is the James Hardie case, whereby an Australian company 
knowingly poisoned its workers with asbestos for profit. The corporation walled off 
its responsibility in order to let the profits be unmolested by its victims. Eventually 
the company’s responsibility was defined by the courts, but a year later no 
compensation had yet been paid. And although the director was sacked for this, he 
received far more money than any of the victims would.  
 
In daily life we may note that businesses ‘fall over’ if their network fails, and we are 
often told ‘the computers are down’ and nothing can be done, or that the computer 
does not allow a certain type of response. Telephone service centres seem designed to 
cause people to hang up after long periods of waiting, and the workers generally have 
little knowledge beyond that provided by the computer. Fault and responsibility is 
distributed elsewhere. This distributed responsibility does not increase representation, 
rebellion or resistance, but confusion and frustration. 
 
The political Left also distributes responsibility. The Left in Australia was voted out 
of high office; it no longer has any party with appeal (both the main parties in 
Australia and the USA being of the Right), and it yields to the inevitabilities of the 
market and globalisation. The Left often refuses to accept how much it had penetrated 
the State. The Left can even see its own achievements, such as social security, simply 
as modes of state control, and thus surrendered to the Right’s rollback of these 
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achievements. The Autonomist position, as opposed to the operaismo, has always 
been to find power out of the State rather than within it, but this may simply surrender 
control to the Right. It might well be strategically better to see the State as a site of 
struggle (although not the only such site), rather than just a site of control. 
 
To some extent, the success of the popularist religious Right in countries such as the 
U.S.A. demonstrates something else. They have not sat passively back, but have 
organised and taken responsibility for their cause. Certainly they have been co-opted 
by the corporate Right, largely because the Right is historically capable of using 
religion while the Left is not, and the Right can be openly authoritarian and repressive 
while the Left cannot (until it achieves power at least). Meanwhile the conservative 
critique of capitalism has been forgotten to the extent that most people do not seem to 
know of its existence.  
 
Without exploring this in detail, or denying the complexities involved, I would 
suggest that the success of the religious Right involved people meeting regularly 
offline, and in seeing their identity as involved in their actions. Their churches and 
groups are organised in a fairly traditional cell arrangement, under various 
organisations that have national reach and national figures. They are elitist. They 
communicate through mainstream broadcast media (mainly radio and TV) to promote 
their aims, as well as through internet groups. They act on specific widely promoted 
issues—not in terms of a uniform policy. This means that if people disagree with a 
particular action they do not participate in that action; but they do not have to split 
from the group. The issues are chosen with wide appeal. Whatever the complexities 
involved here, the success of the religious Right does point to the fact that 
surrendering to distributed governance, or engaging only in action outside the state, 
may limit the Left’s potential for success. 
 
Actions such as those used by the religious Right, however, are not the spontaneous 
organisation of Negri’s Multitudes. In fact distributed power causes a problem for 
revolutionaries as the adversary seems to have disappeared (Negri 2004, 92). All 
Negri can council is withdrawal, although this may not be possible for everyone 
(2004, 93). Resistance can be discovered at a private level; there are possibilities 
beyond oneself (94). Faced with the vagueness of distributed governance, we retreat 
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away from others. This too is based on an Autonomist tradition (Tronti 1965) 
whereby the workers were to withdraw co-operation, or to engage in strikes and 
sabotage. However, in a system in which everyone is intertwined, to where do people 
withdraw? Negri’s suggestion is that people withdraw to the internet, especially the 
areas apparently outside corporate control. 
 
The internet and radicalism 
At the beginning of Empire, despite their reliance on information society-type 
theorising, Hardt and Negri are sceptical about the internet. They write about various 
intense struggles over the world:  
 
First, each struggle, though firmly rooted in local conditions, leaps immediately to the 
global level and attacks the imperial constitution in its generality. Second, all the 
struggles destroy the traditional distinction between economic and political struggles. 
The struggles are at once economic, political, and cultural-and hence they are biopolitical 
struggles, struggles over the form of life. They are constituent struggles, creating new 
public spaces and new forms of community …. [However,] the struggles do not 
communicate despite their being hypermediatized, on television, the Internet, and every 
other imaginable medium. Once again we are confronted by the paradox of 
incommunicability. (2000, 56) 
 
Later Hardt and Negri seem to forget the uncoordinated nature of single-purpose 
pressure groups, or of groups gathered together over a slogan or over a particular 
point presented in the media (as in the protests in the U.S.A. over the death of Terri 
Schiavo through removal of her life support). By the end of Empire optimism reigns: 
 
In political terms, the global information infrastructure might be characterized as the 
combination of a democratic mechanism and an oligopolistic mechanism, which operate 
along different models of network systems. The democratic network is a completely 
horizontal and deterritorialized model. The Internet, which began as a project of DARPA 
(the U.S. Defense Department Advanced Research Projects Agency), but has now 
expanded to points throughout the world, is the prime example of this democratic 
network structure .... This democratic model is what Deleuze and Guattari call a rhizome, 
a nonhierarchical and noncentered network structure. (2000, 298-99) 
 
In his informal conversations Negri also points to the internet as a source of 
collaborative freedom: ‘levels of cooperation and sharing exist everywhere, even 
writing an article on a computer means having to rely on a common knowledge, 
which is to say the Internet’ (2004, 27). And, ‘[C]ontrary to what is believed, people 
have become more communist than before’ (2004, 27). Seeing collaboration as 
evidence of incipient communism is as misguided as seeing all trade, or exchange, as 
capitalist.  
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The history of the internet is more complex than portrayed by Negri and Hardt. 
Although the internet was largely built by programmers using exchange of 
information in a way resembling open source groups, it has to be recognised that the 
internet grew within the framework of military, academic, corporate, and 
governmental action, as well as through the activities of programmers. It was already 
embedded in power, and in pre-existing usages and pathways. Many histories of the 
internet ignore the overwhelming early use of the ARPANet by the military 
(demonstrated by the extent to which this network diminished when the military 
separated from it); or the sheer number of independent corporate based computer 
networks, and their expansion, in the same period; or the volume of state expenditure 
in this field. This emphasis on programmers could serve a political-identity creating 
purpose by portraying programmers as supposedly free from external imposition and 
restraint, and perhaps helps relieve any unease about accepting the imperatives of 
those for whom they actually worked—especially in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
discourse of net history has been governed by the rubrics of individualism and 
futurity, which are among the most popular ways of describing capitalism and 
technology.  
 
However, this perspective is not the only possible way to view net history. For 
example, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission inquiry into The Matter of 
Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and 
Communication Services and Facilities, which began in 1966, was told that the 
number of non-defence computer systems had risen from 91 in 1953 to more than 
35,000 in 1966, and that more than 2,000 online systems were in use with more than 
45,000 data terminals (Schiller 1982, 22). Representatives from the petroleum, 
aerospace, computer, banking, insurance, transport and retail sectors all testified 
before the inquiry into the importance of data transmission and computer networks in 
their forward planning. They all uniformly complained that the transmission services 
offered by AT&T hindered this computerisation (23-34). Commercial networks were 
widespread and militant before the ARPANet was even begun. 
 
Similarly, in 1980, the International Communications Association submitted to the 
FCC that ‘international telecommunications provides the pipeline which enables U.S. 
industry to extend its enterprise to the vast world markets’ (Schiller 1982, 99). A 1982 
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Business Week article stressed how communication was seen as essential to the 
internationalisation of corporations. It claimed ‘US multinationals are locating their 
foreign offices in cities with the most accommodating PTTs [Post, Telgraph and 
Telephone providers]’ (1985, 129). One example would be Ford setting up its 
communications office in Britain because British regulations both allowed it to 
establish a private email system (Business Week 1985, 129), and to use computer 
services back in the U.S.A. (Schiller 1982, 100).  
 
All of these developments in networking were concerned with speedy control of 
widespread operations, with processing huge volumes of information to aid in that 
control, and facilitating centralised response. Such developments also show that 
despite Hardt and Negri’s arguments to the contrary, distributed governance and 
capitalistic networking preceded the Multitude’s use of the internet. Perhaps in 
Autonomist terms this process can be seen as part of the mobile liberation of the 
corporate sector from local borders and local workers.  
 
Although it is tempting to think of hackers in terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
nomadology, the Critical Art Ensemble points out that it is actually the elite who uses 
cyberspace to make 
 
a diffuse power field without location, and a fixed sight machine appearing as spectacle 
... hostility from the oppressed is rechannelled into the bureaucracy which misdirects 
antagonism away from the nomadic power field. The retreat into invisibility of non 
location prevents [the definition] ... of a site of resistance .... No longer needing to take a 
defensive posture is the nomad’s greatest strength. (1994, 15-6) 
 
As Sterling’s book The Hacker Crackdown (1994) demonstrates that hackers were at 
the mercy of a more mobile authority. Hackers were generally caught in their 
bedrooms. 
 
Of course, this history of the internet being entwined with distribution of corporate, 
state and military bodies does not mean the internet could not be commandeered for 
other uses. More to Hardt and Negri’s point are the free and open source software 
movements. They, supposedly,  more clearly challenge capitalist ideas of property and 
show the democratic potential of the Multitude.  
 
 
PORTAL vol. 3, no. 1 January 2006  15 
 
 
Marshall  Negri, Hardt, distributed governance and open source software 
 
Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) movements 
Hardt and Negri write that ‘we might also understand the decision-making capacity of 
the Multitude in analogy with the collaborative development of computer software 
and the innovations of the open source movement’ (2004, 339). Open source allows 
people to read and modify the source code of computer programs. The openness 
theoretically means that software bugs are fixed quickly and better programs 
produced as more people can see into the code and modify it. As Hardt and Negri 
argue, ‘The democracy of the Multitude, then, is as an open source society, that is a 
society in which source code is revealed so that we can all work collaboratively to 
solve its bugs and create new, better social programs’ (2000, 340).2 It is not, however, 
clear that open sources actually work like this. Even the notion that capitalist property 
rights are challenged by open source is disputed within the movement (Raymond 
1998, 1999).  
 
Following on from their assertions about open source, Hardt and Negri claim that ‘in 
the Multitude the right to disobedience and the right to difference are fundamental’ 
(2004, 340). This is not the case in open source groups, because technical ability has 
to be recognised and the groups are organised, at least partially, through attributing 
this recognition and through its contestation. As such they are rightly not only 
hierarchical, but also elitist with respect to those with no expertise. Ideas that do not 
translate into technical terms are discounted. We may consider the common elite 
programmer refusal of post-modernism (Morningstar 1993), and their common 
assumptions of being able to solve all social problems without knowing any sociology 
or anthropology, or even knowing much about societies other than their own. In some 
ways the FOSS movement is a closed or limited culture, and has to be. It is not open 
in the sense of welcoming all comers. Furthermore, if there is a dispute that is not 
easily resolvable by agreed technological criteria, disputes are often resolved by a 
‘fork.’ The groups separate, and largely ignore each other from then on. That may not 
be possible in large interdependent social groups.  
 
Variants of open source are common online. For example, the wiki model of 
distributed authorship has no person to ‘blame.’ Cynically we can observe that the 
                                                          
2 This is also the message of programmer Pekka Himanen’s work The Hacker Ethic and the Spirit of 
the Information Age (2001b). For a criticism of this book see Marshall (2003).  
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founder of wiki was planning to sell versions of wiki, and remarked that he should be 
able to ‘kill’ Encyclopaedia Britannica, because he does not have to pay his writers 
(Goetz 2003). This kind of thing lead Terranova (2000) to suggest that the main 
function of open source is to provide free labour to be exploited within the capitalist 
economy. Many corporations from AOL to IBM have considered themselves 
unthreatened by using open source or volunteer labour. It means that the sales base is 
implicated in keeping the product they use moving and improving, acting in some 
ways like a self-service store. To participate in open source people have to have some 
other source of income. 
 
It has often been remarked that FOSS, despite the actions of some notable figures, and 
despite fierce internal debate about the differences between free and open source 
software and their social consequences (say between Richard Stallman and Eric 
Raymond), is almost deliberately non-political. Thus Coleman, writing in support of 
FOSS in general, states that ‘One might suspect FOSS of having a deliberate political 
agenda, but when asked, FOSS developers invariably offer a firm and unambiguous 
“no” – usually followed by a precise lexicon for discussing the proper relationship 
between FOSS and politics’ (2004, 507). Coleman goes on to suggest that this 
apolitical stance is one way in which the movement tries to work politically:  
 
[It] facilitates the broad mobility of FOSS as artefacts and metaphors and thus lays the 
groundwork for its informal political scope, its key role as a catalyst by which to rethink 
the assumptions of intellectual property rights through its use and inversion (2004, 
508)…. [However, some of the appeal of apolticism may be because] it has afforded a 
wider cultural and political language by which to objectify to themselves and larger 
publics the nature of their technical life world, an objectification buttressed within a 
hacker public sphere and as a political vector to make claims against the aggressive 
application of intellectual property restrictions, primarily in the defence of other 
programmers. (2004, 511) 
 
The ideal of open source groups is technical meritocracy, that is, an elite to some 
extent separated from political and social issues, using its position to criticise those 
not of the elite. As Coleman puts it: 
 
politics tend to be seen by programmers as buggy, mediated, and tainted action clouded 
by ideology that is not productive of much of anything while it insidiously works against 
true forms of free thought. You can’t tweak politics in an elegant and creative way to 
achieve something immediately gratifying, and thus it goes against everything 
programmers think and love about computing (2004, 513). 
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This isolation could even cripple their own effectiveness in their own projects. Chan 
describes the way people within the Peruvian state acted to ensure that Peru would 
forsake Microsoft and embrace open source or free software for its main computer 
systems. This success was portrayed by FOSS people overseas not as a local 
politicised event but as an inevitable part of the international success of free software, 
a point made by Chan: 
 
Far from presuming free software’s steady advancement, the proponents of Peru’s free 
software legislation undertook various forms of local and non-local work, advocacy, and 
activism to propel the visibility of their movement. Further, their practices departed from 
the language of technical and economic rationality that had been repeatedly invoked to 
explain free software’s adoption. They insisted instead on a new framing of free software 
as necessarily engaged and invested in processes of governance and political reform…. 
Peru’s free software advocates actively sought to build relations with bodies of 
governance, demonstrating a willingness to engage with traditional political channels. 
(2004, 532) 
 
In other words, this was not the Multitude abandoning the State and paths already 
established for something else. It is true they established contacts throughout the 
world, and especially in South America to engage in their activism, but it was not a 
product of electronic networks alone—they were an adjunct. 
 
Prominent U.S.-based FOSS people were not supportive of the political action in 
Peru, as Chan notes: 
 
Tony Stanco, a senior policy analyst at The George Washington University’s Cyberspace 
Policy Institute… [warned] against the imposition of politics over rational markets. 
Writing in Linux Today, Stanco asserted, ‘It is much better for governments to set up a 
real level playing field in procurement policy and then let the market decide on merit. If a 
product can’t make it in the market without government mandates, then history has 
shown that it won’t make it with government mandates either.’ … Stanco was echoed by 
other free software supporters, who, in a Brookings Institute publication aimed at 
government policy makers themselves … collectively urged governments to maintain a 
stance of neutrality in software acquisition policy. Some insisted that free software would 
advance without the need for government involvement … while others argued that free 
software preferences would compromise consumer freedom of choice. (2004, 534) 
 
Even Richard Stallman, who is usually considered to be the ‘raving communist’ of the 
free software movement, reacted by asserting that ‘energies would be better spent 
preventing governments’ over-regulation and infringement on user freedoms, than on 
fostering ties to legislative bodies’ (Chan 2004, 543).  
 
Apathy to anti-capitalism is not uncommon. Pekka Himanen said in an interview on 
this matter: 
 
PORTAL vol. 3, no. 1 January 2006  18 
 
 
Marshall  Negri, Hardt, distributed governance and open source software 
 
 
there is not any irreconcilable contradiction between hackerism and money. As long as the 
Linux companies still work through the open source model the hacker spirit rules. Even the 
radical Richard Stallman stresses that ‘free software’ or ‘open source software’ is not about 
money but freedom or openness. He says that we should think of freedom (or openness) in the 
sense of the expression ‘free expression,’ not ‘free beer’…. Even if you just want to win the 
competition, the best strategy for your greedy goals is not closedness but openness.’ (2001a) 
 
Given that these people tend to see markets as neutral, not political, and as providing 
the best solution as determined by a technical elite, they are perhaps not the best 
model for open activism.  
 
Are FOSS groups even open to those with the technical abilities? Although research 
has not been detailed, it appears that these groups are male focused and not open to 
gender differences. Given the history of hacking (programming), as it has been 
described by Turkle (1984) and Levy (1994), this is not surprising. Most of the 
available comment is written by women who participate in open source and, while 
defending open source groups, they portray a society that is patronising, aggressive, 
sexually obsessive, and discriminatory. Val Henson (2002) writes: 
 
I also used to believe that sexism was dead. Shortly after joining several women in 
computing mailing lists, I realized how wrong I was. Week after week, women have new 
stories about how they were discriminated against and insulted because they were 
women. These stories aren’t decades old, nor do they involve people who grew up when 
sexism was more acceptable. These are day-to-day experiences of today’s women, in 
modern settings, who are being driven out of their chosen profession by sexism. 
 
Henson tells of how women who attend offline meetings may be pointed at, or greeted 
with silence, as they enter the room. And Yuwei Lin writes:  
 
I have observed that when Allison [Randal, president of the Perl Foundation] spoke at the 
Italian Code Jam 2004 activity, she acted, and also was treated, rather as an assistant for 
Larry Wall than being an outstanding programmer whom would be granted as much 
respect as her male peers. (2005, 4) 
 
A survey of the FOSS movement states ‘The FLOSS survey on OS/FS developers 
confirms the findings of the WIDI project that women do not play a role in the 
development of open source and free software; only 1.1% of the FLOSS sample is 
female’ (Ghosh et al, Part 4, 8). It might be mentioned that this is the only sentence in 
the report with the word ‘gender’ in it. The gender equalities that Hardt and Negri 
report from Latin American resistance movements, and which they advance as the 
way of the Multitude, are not present in FOSS movements. 
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Structurally the FOSS groups tend not to be so equitable amongst men either. Lerner 
and Tirole remark that ‘the top decile of contributors accounted for fully 72% of the 
code,’ and this was accepted by the group (2002, 204). They also note that ‘Important 
contributors are few and ascend to the “core group” status, the ultimate recognition by 
one’s peers’ (205). These groups also have leaders who have been described, to me, 
as ‘benevolent dictators.’ Bosco remarks: 
 
It should be noted that there is a central figure called ‘project leader’ or ‘maintainer’ who 
is in charge for accepting, reviewing and integrating new features or fixes into the main 
source code. Once the project leader has reviewed and accepted the contribution, it is 
eventually integrated and delivered to the large public of users in the next software 
version. (2004, 12) 
 
Lerner and Tirole suggest that a leader must convince ‘contributors … that their 
leader’s objectives are sufficiently congruent with theirs and not polluted by ego-
driven, commercial or political biases’ (2002, 222). The initial leader seems usually to 
be the person who can present enough source code to suggest that the project is viable 
to enough people who might want to help. Bosco continues:  
 
In addition, a project leader provides a coordination service to the participants of the 
project; he makes sure that contributors working on the development of the same 
functionality are in contact with each other and hopefully collaborate; he makes sure that 
the development goes smoothly and tries to ease up tensions between disagreeing 
developers. (2004, 19) 
 
Occasionally, as with the Apache Server, the software may be controlled by a small 
group of people who vote on particular changes and developments (Bosco 2004, 20). 
These projects do not automatically arise out of the equitable uncoordinated 
functioning of the Multitude. A leader is essentially responsible for decisions even 
though these leaders cannot fire, imprison, or execute people, and have to rely on their 
abilities to culturally convince others, to maintain their position and prevent forks. 
This is helped by what Bosco calls a taboo on forking (25), although this could also 
be explained by the reluctance to engage in duplicate work. Bosco argues that people 
perceive leaders as good if they are technically competent, are dedicated (expend 
time), have a vision of the project’s future, correct bugs, and are patient (48).  
 
Programmer Alan Cox (1998) commented on the leadership elite factor when 
describing an effort to port Linux to an 8086. He suggests that good programmers are 
‘relatively unusual. Not only that but the difference between a true ‘real programmer’ 
and the masses is significantly greater than that between ‘great’ and ‘average’ in 
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many other professions. Studies have quoted 30 to 1 differences in productivity 
between the best and the rest’ (1998). Cox complains that the project was inundated 
with bad programmers ‘with opinions—not code, opinions.’ As a result ‘the real 
developers have many of the other list members in their kill files’ and the group 
turned into a core team that ignored the rest. Interestingly Cox seems to think this was 
both inevitable and sad. It takes work to ‘separate useful people from the noise.’ In 
this sense technical elitism can be seen as pragmatic—it enables the groups to 
function. Elitism is also obvious in the technical competency necessary to be able to 
use open source products. The products are not suited for beginners. Sometimes this 
complexity is so great that even open source guru Eric Raymond (2004) has 
commented on the difficulties of implementing the software.  
 
Apart from technical elitism, what other kinds of social structures or political 
processes emerge in FOSS communities? Crowston and Howison examined 120 
project teams and suggest ‘that it is wrong to assume that FOSS projects are 
distinguished by a particular social structure merely because they are FOSS’ (2004, 
1). They assert that larger projects may tend to become more modular, with groups 
less connected to the general network. Again this suggests that our models for 
understanding networking are not complex enough. It may well be that all networks 
are not the same, and that the way communication is structured effects the dynamics 
of the groups that arise (Marshall 2004). Technology both enables and restricts 
actions, and so its potentials must be considered carefully. Vague assumptions about 
how difference arises, and reducing all difference to the same difference, as in Negri 
and Hardt’s use of the term Multitude, obscure these problems. 
 
Conclusions 
With the idea of Empire, Negri and Hardt point to the importance of distributed 
governance in the contemporary world. However, Empire and Multitude are not 
separable and opposed but intertwined, and distributed governance is not inherently 
radical; it can legitimate and extend the control of those who already have more 
power, and reinforce easily activated pathways. Negri and Hardt seem not to perceive 
the real diversity of the Multitude, or that resistance to Empire could be localised, 
reactionary, or oppressive. People could seek fundamentalist certainties in the face of 
a chronically fluid dominance. Even if Multitude is composed of knowledge workers, 
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or workers in the immaterial sense, who need to collaborate on projects and produce 
with their own creativity, those workers may still be fragmented as a group, and the 
forces that allow them to collaborate may also keep them apart—especially if action is 
confined to virtual realms.  
 
FOSS movements are not an unproblematic model for democratic, non-hierarchical 
revolutionary, action. People in the movements tend to self constitute as a hierarchical 
technical elite (which is not necessarily a bad thing), and they tend to view politics as 
something they should not be involved in, perhaps as a way of generating unity 
amongst themselves. They favour quietist and technical solutions, and when technical 
solutions within their framework are not immediately obvious, they tend to lose 
interest. They are also inclined to ignore people who are not of the same group, and to 
ignore issues of promulgation.  
 
What can activists learn from all this? Firstly, it is probably advisable not be seduced 
by technology in itself. As the early Autonomists emphasised, technology may result 
from a reaction to a perceived lack of control by dominant groups. Any beneficial 
freeing effects taken up by the Multitude may produce more attempts at control. Thus 
struggle is dynamic within the technology. Technology enables and restricts. It is not 
entirely positive or negative; the effects have to be created.  
 
It is possible to learn from those who have succeeded, such as the FOSS supporters in 
Peru who continued ‘normal’ political action within the state. The success of Right-
wing Christians in mobilising cannot be ignored—Left-wing Christians have not been 
as successful. This is remarkable, as the differences splitting these organisations are at 
least as great as differences within the Left, and their potential differences with the 
corporatist Right could be explosive. As I have implied earlier the religious Right 
does not let responsibility lie elsewhere; it takes action. The religious Right also takes 
action within the official power structures of the state, rather than hoping that new 
structures will arise. In that sense the religious Right claims the power structures of 
the state for itself. 
 
Taking responsibility, rather than allowing that responsibility to be distributed, and 
acting within a particular place, rather than only within vague online spaces, is 
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important. The idea of distributed governance suggests that those in power are not 
always in control; they are also confused, and governance can escape them. The 
network is complicated. Thus they may well tend to be either over-reactive or helpless 
in the face of a prolonged active and vocal opposition that assumes it can actually do 
something about the situation in question. Finally, from the hackers themselves we 
can learn from Cox’s idea that everyone who is interested can do something, but not 
everyone has to do everything. Some people make the tea, or write the manuals, and 
these actions are important. 
 
The internet can provide a medium for action, but it is not in itself radical or a model 
for that action, and neither are all the groups that have used the internet as their basis 
for communication. The internet, or communication technology more generally, is 
also a site of struggle, as Autonomist theory points out. It is a tool that can be co-
opted, implemented and changed to support the dominant groups. It can help to 
fracture the Multitude, thus transforming the tool back to its origin as a mode of 
extending corporate, military and State power. The world is shaped by ongoing 
political struggle, not by the inevitable forces of society and technology. 
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